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Ana E. Juncos
School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
ABSTRACT
With the failure of liberal peace strategies in the Global South, resilience has
recently become the risk management strategy par excellence in
peacebuilding. Since it is not possible to predict when the next crisis will take
place, peacebuilders must invest in bottom-up adaptive capacities to cope
with external shocks. This article moves away from governmentality accounts
of resilience which are overtly deterministic and depoliticizing. Instead, it
posits that the uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity associated with
resilience mean that we should expect opportunities for contestation and
institutional agency. This argument will be illustrated by drawing upon the
European Union’s adoption of the resilience approach in its peacebuilding
and security policies. The article argues that while uncertainty, ambiguity, and
complexity constitute the ontological conditions that underpin the rise of
resilience in peacebuilding, they are also likely to lead to its potential demise.
KEYWORDS Resilience; peacebuilding; contestation; uncertainty; ambiguity; complexity
The advent of a “risk society” (Beck, 1992) has transformed international con-
temporary interventions in the Global South. Following the tropes of uncer-
tainty, ambiguity, and complexity, resilience has now become the risk
management strategy par excellence in peacebuilding and humanitarian inter-
ventions. Since it is not possible to predict when or where the next crisis will
take place in a context of deep uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity, inter-
national peacebuilders must invest in local, bottom-up adaptive capacities to
cope with and adapt to external disturbances and shocks. This article will
argue that uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity have become the ontologi-
cal conditions that underpin the rise of resilience. It will also show how they
are likely to lead to resilience’s potential demise.
Theoretically, this article takes as a starting point the critical scholarship on
resilience as a new form of neoliberal governmentality. Yet, it moves away
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from this deterministic, depoliticizing, and deeply pessimistic account to
argue that the uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity associated with resili-
ence mean that we should expect unintended consequences to open up
spaces for contestation and institutional agency. This will be demonstrated
by examining the implementation of resilience and how, as part of this
process, we can observe instances of decoupling, slippage, and resistance,
which in turn can be linked to the ontological and epistemological conditions
that underpin resilience in peacebuilding.
I will begin this article with an overview of the rise of resilience in peace-
building. I will then examine the critical scholarship on resilience which
conceives resilience as a new form of (neoliberal) governance in modern
politics. I will suggest that such conceptualizations neglect the possibility of
contestation and agency. Instead, I will show that, as a result of uncertainty,
ambiguity, and complex institutional settings, what we might see is a very
diﬀerent implementation of resilience, including instances of resistance. It is
partly these processes of contestation that explain the gap between resilience
discourses and international practice, which might result in the failure of this
approach and its potential demise. In developing these arguments, I will draw
on the example of the European Union (EU) and how it has sought to adopt
and implement resilience in its foreign and security policies.1
From liberal peace to resilience: Peacebuilding as risk
management
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, international interventions attempted to
address conﬂicts in the Global South by focusing on statebuilding, strengthening
state institutions, and creating the conditions for free elections and free markets,
as a way to promote peacebuilding (Paris, 2004). However, the failure of univers-
alist and externally imposed liberal peace strategies led to a rethink of
international intervention (Chandler, 2014). This shift in contemporary inter-
ventionary strategies was to be linked to new ideas of uncertainty, ambiguity,
and complexity which would converge around the new concept of resilience.
Such transformation can already be observed in the establishment of the
2004 United Nations (UN) High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and
Change (United Nations, 2004). The focus of the report was on the protection
of populations and the prevention of threats, but this was articulated through
a new emphasis on international threats as “shared vulnerabilities” and “inter-
national security as risk management” (Zanotti, 2010, p. 10). Risks were now
understood as systemic risks, embedded in larger, more complex societal pro-
cesses and whose probabilities were diﬃcult to calculate (as opposed to simple
risks) (Renn, Klinke, & Van Asselt, 2011). The key assumption was that, given
the diﬃculty of predicting and calculating risk, the focus should be on preven-
tion. Moreover, in the context of a risk society of temporally and spatially
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de-bounded risks, failed or fragile states were seen as “risky” states in need of
risk management techniques (Clapton & Hameiri, 2012).
It is possible to trace the emergence of resilience back to the abovemen-
tioned initial shift, as the focus of peacebuilding practice shifted to incorporate
the management of systemic risks. Drawing on ecological understandings of
society as a system in constant change, resilience is conceptualized as “a
measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes of state variables,
driving variables and parameters, and still persist” (Holling, 1973, p. 17).
This presupposes the acceptance of contingency and uncertainty—and thus
risk—in complex systems. While the use of the resilience concept was initially
limited to systems ecology and biology, it is now widely applied in other areas
including peacebuilding, but also climate change, disaster response, develop-
ment, and humanitarian aid (see Chandler & Coaﬀee, 2017).
Resiliencemarks a shift from a logic focused on known threats to a new gov-
ernmental logic which emphasizes complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity,
and therefore the impossibility of predicting threats (Corry, 2014). Under resi-
lience, the post-Cold War world of enemies is replaced by a world of risks
(Clapton&Hameiri, 2012). In this vein, the EU’s JointCommunication on resi-
lience advocates “the need to move away from crisis containment to a more
structural, long-term, non-linear approach to vulnerabilities, with an emphasis
on anticipation, prevention and preparedness” and recognizes that “develop-
ment, and progress towards democracy, peace and security, is not a linear
process” (European Commission and High Representative of the EU, 2017,
pp. 2, 23). Resilience requires us to be prepared for unknown systemic risks.
It posits adaptation, learning by doing and ﬂexibility as a way to respond to
shocks, to embrace change and to live with rather than completely eliminate
uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity (Evans & Reid, 2014).
In peacebuilding, resilience is also linked to a new understanding of the
world and a recognition of the failures and limitations of past interventionist
practices (Joseph, 2016). These are times of deep uncertainty or, in the words
of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS), “we live in times of existential crisis, within
and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European
project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy,
is being questioned” (High Representative of the EU, 2016, p. 7). The latter
also emphasizes the role played by ambiguity, understood here as a situation
where there are diﬀerent value-based perspectives regarding the severity of a
particular threat (Renn et al., 2011). Complexity is at the heart of new resili-
ence approaches too (de Coning, 2016). Given a “more connected, contested
and complex world” (EEAS, 2015), we need to focus on building the resilience
of governments, communities, and individuals (Council of the EU, 2013, p. 1).
Moreover, risk and resilience are said to be closely connected. According to
the EU’s Joint Communication, “resilience requires risk-informed program-
ming. Action to address the underlying diverse causes of fragility should be
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accompanied with risk management measures to protect populations from
shocks and stresses” (European Commission and High Representative of
the EU, 2017, p. 24).
In sum, resilience acknowledges deep uncertainty, ambiguity, and
complexity as contemporary conditions. Rather than resorting to external
intervention as was the case in the past, resilience discourses emphasize
internal capabilities as the best way to deal with these challenges. Resilience,
understood as “the internal capacity of societies to cope with crises, with the
emphasis on the development of self-organization and internal capacities
and capabilities rather than the external provision of aid, resources or
policy solutions” (Chandler, 2015, p. 13), ﬁts with people-centered approaches
and the “local turn” in peacebuilding (Ejdus & Juncos, 2018). It is also in line
with new approaches to peacebuilding as “sustaining peace” (de Coning,
2016). Resilience thus operates a turn from the international to the local
(governments, societies, organizations, and individuals), which is now
(made) responsible for managing and engaging with systemic risks. The key
question here asks what, if any, are the implications of the adoption of
resilience as a risk management strategy. The next section explores some
tentative explanations.
Resilience as neoliberal governmentality
The new focus on risk and resilience at the international level has been linked
to particular forms of governance (Best, 2008; O’Malley, 2004). Processes of
governance appear increasingly concerned with managing risk and by doing
so resort to particular technologies of government and constitute particular
subjects. In the case of peacebuilding, it has been argued that “international
security is pursued through the intensiﬁcation of techniques of government
aimed at knowing, monitoring and taming a plurality of sources of danger
that could combine in unpredictable manners, including those that aﬀect,
or are created by, populations” (Zanotti, 2010, p. 21). According to these criti-
cal accounts, the rise of resilience is closely connected with neoliberal forms of
governance, better understood as governmentality (Joseph, 2014). Govern-
mentality, deﬁned as “the conduct of conduct,” is a form of government
that takes populations as its main target, political economy as its main form
of knowledge and apparatuses of security as the main technical means at its
disposal (Foucault, 2007, p. 108). Liberal governmentality works from a dis-
tance by seeking to govern through consent, self-regulation, and individual
responsibilization rather than direct imposition. It is the ﬁt with these neolib-
eral forms of power that explains the spread of resilience. As explained by
Walker and Cooper (2011), “the success of this ecological concept in coloniz-
ing multiple arenas of governance is due to its intuitive ideological ﬁt with a
neoliberal philosophy of complex adaptive systems” (p. 153).
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While the critical approach articulated above helps us understand resi-
lience’s emphasis on reﬂexivity, responsibility, preparedness, and adaptability
at the individual level, it has also been criticized for painting a picture of resi-
lience that is all-oppressing and unstoppable. This view ignores contingency
and unintended consequences, and it forecloses opportunities for agency
and resistance. In fact, this follows a tendency in the governmentality litera-
ture to create a dichotomy between those governing and the subjects of gov-
ernance, allowing little room for agency—with subjects appearing as passive
objects of liberal governmentality (Bevir, 2011). However, as argued else-
where, resilience does not have to be exclusively tied to a neoliberal logic or
ruling out resistance (Corry, 2014; Dunn Cavelty, Kaufmann, & Søby Kristen-
sen, 2015; Schmidt, 2015); in some cases, it might even assist resistance prac-
tices (Bourbeau & Ryan, 2018; Ryan, 2015).
This article contributes to this literature by focusing on resilience-building
approaches in peacebuilding. It argues that by examining the adoption of resi-
lience in peacebuilding, it is possible to detect many opportunities for agency
and contestation (see also Dunn Cavelty et al., 2015). Such an analysis pays
more attention to agency, contingency, and heterogeneity in resilience
approaches than previous governmentality studies of resilience have. In this
regard, some of the peacebuilding scholarships has already demonstrated
how uncertainty and ambiguity have undermined the implementation of
the liberal peace (Autesserre, 2014; Pouligny, 2006). As put by Zanotti
(2010), “practical implementations of the script of international governance
are ridden with ambiguities, indecision and continuous contingent and
context-speciﬁc negotiations of divergent sets of principles and practical
necessities” (p. 19). This ambiguity and uncertainty open up opportunities
for contestation.
To illustrate the broader implementation of resilience approaches in peace-
building, the article examines the adoption of resilience in the EU and how, as
part of this process, we can observe instances of decoupling and contestation.
It is the ontological and epistemological conditions associated with resilience
(uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity) that help explain such departures
from the resilience “script.” First, uncertainty explains gaps in the implemen-
tation of resilience approaches resulting in decoupling; second, ambiguity
explains how the malleability of the resilience term leads to contestation;
ﬁnally, the complexity that led to the adoption of an integrated approach in
the ﬁrst place prevents the eﬀective implementation of resilience approaches
in peacebuilding.
While others have focused on the agency of those at the recipient end of
resilience initiatives, that is, the communities or populations that are made
resilient (e.g., Corry, 2014; Dunn Cavelty et al., 2015; Ryan, 2015), the focus
here is on institutional agency, that is, the implementing agents that are
responsible for the operationalization of resilience programs. In the case of
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the EU and its new resilience approach, institutional agency resurfaces as a
way to deal with uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity and provides
evidence of contestation and sometimes resistance to broader international
discourses of resilience. The sections below examine these processes of
contestation by drawing on the notions of uncertainty, ambiguity, and
complexity.
Uncertainty and the emergence of a new resilience paradigm
At the core of the resilience approach rests a deep ontological and epistemo-
logical uncertainty. First, the world appears to be complex, with structures,
causes, and processes seen as nonlinear. This is compounded by an “epistemo-
logical denial that we can have any trust in our knowledge of this world”
(Joseph, 2016, p. 379). Coping with uncertainty requires new modes of analy-
sis that go beyond our dominant sets of knowledge. This sense of uncertainty
is exacerbated by the failure of liberal approaches to peacebuilding.
It is the ontological and epistemological uncertainty outlined above that
partly explains why resilience has been adopted as the main approach in
peacebuilding by a number of international organizations. According to
DiMaggio and Powell (1983), under conditions of uncertainty, we should
expect mimetic isomorphism; in other words, we can expect to see organiz-
ations imitating or following the model of other organizations in the same
ﬁeld. The adoption of such models can also have a ritual aspect: enhancing
the legitimacy of the new organization by adopting the models of other organ-
izations (in this case, the UN) that are perceived as more legitimate or success-
ful in an uncertain context (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 152; Meyer &
Rowan, 1977).
Under conditions of uncertainty, most international organizations includ-
ing the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
the UN, and the World Bank have adopted resilience as the main solution to
past intervention failures. Thus, the UN’s “sustaining peace” agenda, which
puts emphasis on building local resilience, is driven by increasing geopolitical
uncertainty (de Coning, 2018). By promoting particular organizational
reforms (the adoption of joint analyses, an integrated approach, risk analysis,
etc.), resilience has become a new modern “management paradigm”
(Garschagen, 2013, p. 31). The EU has been one of the last international
organizations to incorporate resilience as a new foreign policy paradigm
(Juncos, 2017) and as a way to respond to the challenge of “how to sustain
progress in the transformational agenda the EU has set itself, against a back-
drop of a more connected, contested and complex global environment”
(European Commission and High Representative of the EU, 2017, p. 2).
Yet, this approach has been adopted without a clear assessment in place
regarding whether it actually improves the eﬀectiveness of international
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interventions. As an EU oﬃcial explained, there are some OECD and Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO) analyses available, “but we haven’t
done it ourselves and this covers/focuses on diﬀerent instruments/issues, we
don’t have a comprehensive assessment” (Interview 2). This suggests that
the endeavor to achieve legitimacy, rather than eﬀectiveness, might be one
of the reasons why the EU seeks to adopt a resilience approach in the face
of uncertainty.
Importantly, the implementation of resilience might result in unexpected
consequences because of decoupling. This notion takes a more agentic per-
spective, whereby actors can strategize or manage institutional constraints,
leading to a decoupling of practices from formal structures. The gap
between rhetoric and practice results from the fact that, although organiz-
ations seek to adopt institutional myths as part of their organizational
agendas and policies, they rarely align their institutional practice with new
organizational discourses (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Decoupling allows organ-
izations to maintain the legitimacy that comes with the adoption of those
international paradigms, without substantially changing their practices.
Decoupling might have to do with a lack of resources or the existence of com-
peting institutional demands; in other cases, it has to do with a lack of will-
ingness to adopt or even active resistance toward new approaches. This
suggests that while resilience might be understood as neoliberal governance,
the technologies of governing and processes required to implement such an
approach might never be adopted by organizations, hence undermining its
implementation.
This argument can be aptly illustrated by the example of the EU, although
other organizations such as the UN also face similar problems (de Coning,
2018). While resilience discourses have generally been adopted in EU
foreign policy—see, for instance, the EUGS and the new Joint Communi-
cation on resilience—the operationalization of these discourses continues to
be very limited because this would require signiﬁcant institutional reforms
and a much more adaptive and responsive foreign policy. In practice, there
are many institutional constraints that prevent the implementation of the resi-
lience approach by the EU. The consensus-building nature of the EU’s foreign
policy decision-making tends to make the adoption of decisions slow. More-
over, the fragmentation of EU ﬁnancial instruments and burdensome pro-
curement rules have been criticized for negatively aﬀecting the
responsiveness of aid delivery and the implementation of its civilian and mili-
tary operations (Interviews 2, 3, and 7). EU budgetary programs are multiann-
ual and project-speciﬁc, thus preventing the implementation of resilience,
which requires adaptability, ﬂexibility, and so on (Interviews 1, 2, and 7).
Importantly, oﬃcials can resist or slow down the implementation of the
EU’s resilience approach, making decoupling more likely in the short- and
medium-term. As argued by an interviewee, “many [EU oﬃcials] will say,
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‘this is something new, why should we now adopt this new approach?’ This is
only going to mean more work for them, especially for the [EU] Delegations”
(Interview 1). According to another interviewee, EU oﬃcials will not be
willing to adopt a new approach unless there are some incentives in return,
but the implementation of resilience is a long-term process and it is
diﬃcult to incorporate such incentives in the short-term (Interview 2).
Decoupling is also more likely to take place where there are conﬂicting
demands or where there is ambiguity about goals or the environment.
Hence, it is not surprising to see decoupling in the case of resilience given
how ambiguous the concept is. It is to this issue that the next section turns.
Ambiguity: Contesting resilience
In a world of complexity and deep uncertainty, there is also more room for
ambiguity. Ambiguity refers to value contestation and the existence of
ambivalent perspectives regarding a particular risk phenomenon, which
might in turn make risk assessments more diﬃcult to conduct accurately
(Renn et al., 2011). While resilience can be seen as a strategy to deal with
this indeterminacy, many scholars have pointed to the conceptual ambiguity
surrounding the term “resilience” itself, which results in profound confusion
and might undermine its implementation (Brand & Jax, 2007; Walsh-Dilley &
Wolford, 2015).
The conceptual malleability of resilience is key in explaining its widespread
adoption. For Brand and Jax (2007), resilience has become a “boundary
object,” a concept that enables interdisciplinary conversations, even where
each discipline/actor might have diﬀerent understandings of the term. Such
concepts facilitate communication and collaborations bringing diﬀerent scien-
tiﬁc communities together to discuss common challenges. In the case of the
EU, Wagner and Anholt (2016, p. 417) refer to the “constructive ambiguity”
of resilience as a positive element that can be used to bridge diﬀerent
approaches in the EU’s external action. For some, the ambiguous nature of
the concept has facilitated cooperation between traditionally separated ﬁelds,
as represented by the humanitarian, development, and foreign policy commu-
nities (Interviews 8 and 9). Just like in the case of UN peacebuilding, the
inclusion of resilience in the EUGS and the new Joint Communication seeks
to enable a more united approach among these diﬀerent policy communities.
There are other political considerations that favor the use of the term resi-
lience, which are linked to the ambiguity or blurred nature of the concept. By
contrast to other concepts such as “failed states” and “fragile states,” which
have been strongly criticized by partner countries as stigmatizing (Grimm,
2014, p. 258), resilience acts as an “aﬀective force”: a productive force
shaping subjects and communities. Just like the concept of “capacity build-
ing,” resilience not only has an ability to travel, it can also instill optimism
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about the future and build conﬁdence on ones’ capacities (Gabay & Ilcan,
2017). The ambiguity associated with resilience has also appealed to nontra-
ditional international donors such as China and Turkey. As summarized by
Pospisil and Kühn (2016), “diverse interests require the ampliﬁcation of refer-
ence concepts, and resilience allows for all those actors new to the scene of
international assistance to ﬁnd their epistemological niche” (p. 8).
Despite positive elements mentioned above, boundary objects such as resi-
lience can also have negative consequences and “in fact be a hindrance to
scientiﬁc progress” (Brand & Jax, 2007). This is particularly the case where
the meaning of the concept is diluted and stretched so far that it becomes
meaningless. The multiple meanings associated with resilience might there-
fore result in resilience becoming an “empty concept” (de Milliano & Jurriens,
2016).
Problems relating to the ambiguity of the concept aﬀect many diﬀerent
organizations operating in the area of peacebuilding and humanitarian aid.
Diﬀerent policy communities (development, humanitarian, and security/
foreign policy) hold diﬀerent interpretations of resilience which also shape
the way they implement this concept in their peacebuilding practice (de Milli-
ano & Jurriens, 2016). In the case of the EU, these problems are particularly
visible given its institutional fragmentation. This is one of the reasons why the
Joint Communication does not put forward a single deﬁnition of resilience,
instead referring to deﬁnitions in Commission documents and the EUGS
(see European Commission and High Representative of the EU, 2017, p. 3).
The diﬀerences are not just semantic in nature, but deeper than that, which
is why EU oﬃcials repeatedly refer to the existence of diﬀerent “mindsets,”
“communities” of oﬃcials, or even “cultures” in EU foreign policy (Interviews
1, 6, 7, and 9).
Yet, the ambiguity associated with resilience not only enables governance
but also resistance and contestation, with some actors trying to set some
boundaries to avoid discursive or practical slippages. In a complex and uncer-
tain world, conceptual ambiguity exacerbates value contestation. For example,
development actors are concerned that the adoption of the resilience vocabu-
lary by foreign and security actors might disguise the securitization of devel-
opment (Interview 7); for their part, humanitarian actors are concerned about
how this might challenge the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian aid
(Interview 6). Ambiguity can thus prevent the eﬀective operationalization of
resilience by concealing conﬂicts of interests. Grimm (2014) argues that con-
ceptual ambiguity (e.g., in the case of the concept of “fragility”) can reduce the
EU’s capacity to respond to international conﬂicts and crises. For Pospisil
(2018), the ambiguity attached to resilience has a “dark side as it only
serves to ‘obscure the weakness of the EU to do strategy’” (p. 34).
Therefore, ambiguity can be seen as “an object of governance” (Best, 2008,
p. 363). It can be exploited to achieve particular aims, with some actors
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promoting/prioritizing particular understandings of resilience that might
strengthen their relative position. While those dealing with humanitarian
and development policies are more familiar and more inclined to promote
long-term, community-based, and bottom-up understandings of resilience,
those dealing with foreign policy and security policies have often prioritized
state-level resilience (or even stability) and are more skeptical of what a resi-
lience approach can achieve (Interview 1). In sum, the ambiguity surrounding
resilience can trigger contestation within what is already a very fragmented
policy community, in turn aﬀecting its implementation.
Complexity: Implementing an integrated approach
The ﬁnal condition shaping the implementation of resilience is that of com-
plexity. Peacebuilding as risk management is closely connected with complex-
ity and a new emphasis on an integrated approach. In line with new risk
governance approaches (Renn et al., 2011), spatially and temporally
unbounded risks require a comprehensive or integrated response to be
eﬀective. As argued by Zanotti (2010), international spaces are “rethought
as a space of interconnected vulnerabilities, and as the point of application
of an array of biopolitical practices of government aimed at taming multifar-
ious threats to the equilibrium of processes of populations living together”
(pp. 21–22). The complex nature of contemporary conﬂicts requires a multi-
dimensional, multiphased, multilevel, and multilateral approach (High Repre-
sentative of the EU, 2016, pp. 28–29). The EU’s Joint Communication on
resilience also acknowledges that:
For any given outcome, risk—and the ability to cope—needs to be analysed at
multiple levels, particularly at the points at which one factor of resilience, or one
set of actors is dependent on the resilience of others, or where power relations
between diﬀerent levels of society play an important role. (European Commis-
sion and High Representative of the EU, 2017, p. 24)
Risk management requires not only an integrated response at the organiz-
ational level but also coordination with other actors on the ground. In the
case of UN peacebuilding, holistic interventions are conceived by way of
taming risk as an undertaking it cannot perform alone, but that can only be
carried out by integrating and regulating an array of international and local
constituencies, such as regional organizations, the local police, NGOs, the
private sector and more. (Zanotti, 2010, p. 22)
Such thinking is at the core of the “integrated mission” concept, which in turn
has shaped other organizations understanding of comprehensive security
interventions such as the EU or North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). Resilience thus becomes a “virtual black hole” (Pospisil & Kühn,
2016, p. 7), sucking into its vortex a range of policies from humanitarian,
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development, and foreign and security policy. Furthermore, resilience keeps
expanding its scope by reaching out to other internal policies such as civil pro-
tection, migration, and counter-terrorism to achieve coherence between exter-
nal and internal policies (see European Commission and High Representative
of the EU, 2017).
What it is interesting about resilience is that while complexity justiﬁes this
new approach, the very existence of complexity undermines the implemen-
tation of resilience. The complexity of international peacebuilding interven-
tions regarding causes, actors, and diverging political agendas simply makes
this venture an impossible mission in practice (Zanotti, 2010, pp. 22–24). A
particular case in point is the integration between humanitarian, develop-
ment, and foreign/security policies.
While the advent of resilience seeks to bridge the gaps between short-term
(humanitarian) and long-term approaches to crises (development), problems
remain. This is usefully illustrated by the case of the EU. Here, resilience-
building seeks to promote joint action between humanitarian, development,
environmental and security policies as well as between internal and external
security policies (European Commission and High Representative of the
EU, 2017, p. 2, p. 15). Resilience also implies working on diﬀerent levels (indi-
vidual, community, state, regional, and global) (Interview 1). Resilience has
thus become a proxy for coherence for an actor which has been endlessly cri-
ticized for problems of (in)coherence in its external action (Juncos, 2013).
From this perspective, resilience is understood not as a goal, but as an
approach: “resilience is not a new objective (like preventing violent conﬂicts
is), but a way of operating—more speciﬁcally, a transversal approach; one
that focuses on risk identiﬁcation, endogenous capacities, dealing with com-
munities and individuals” (Interview 2; also Interview 6).
However, it is also possible to identify some unintended consequences
linked to the implementation of an integrated approach. By emphasizing
the need to bring together a range of actors, including local actors and
NGOs, under the guise of local ownership, the new integrated approach
might end up opening new pathways for contestation (Zanotti, 2010).
According to Interview 6, “the humanitarian community and the develop-
ment community are still two diﬀerent voices, their objectives are not
always the same, this is why they have diﬀerent portfolios, diﬀerent objectives,
diﬀerent instruments (ﬁnancial, etc.).” By linking emergency aid to longer-
term preparedness, this might hinder the impartiality, neutrality, and inde-
pendence of EU humanitarian aid, something which has caused “a general
genuine concern, which is not entirely new, with the integrated approach”
(Interview 6). Some EU actors are thus suspicious of the resilience approach,
as they see it as a way for others to encroach upon their respective areas of
competence, or even to endanger their mission/mandates. Tensions are
encouraged not only by the distinct mandates established by the EU Treaties
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which prevent further integration of development and humanitarian policies
but also by the existence of diﬀerent communities of practice, each operating
according to their own interests and methodologies (Interviews 3, 6, and 7).
Hence, there is still a lot of suspicion of, or even open resistance toward the
implementation of resilience in EU foreign policy, especially where this
might entail horizontal or vertical integration.
Conclusion
This article has demonstrated how peacebuilding has recently become a risk
management strategy and has illustrated the role resilience has played in this
transformation. The article has sought to complement perspectives that have
characterized resilience as a new form of neoliberal governance. By analyzing
the way resilience is adopted and conceptualized at the institutional level, it is
possible to realize how resilience discourses often produce unintended conse-
quences that weaken governing practices. The analysis employed by this
article was grounded on the notions of uncertainty, ambiguity, and complex-
ity. While these are at the core of the new resilience thinking, it is also these
ontological conditions that undermine its implementation. Resilience engen-
ders contestation and resistance because of its attendant uncertainty, ambigu-
ity, and complexity. Empirically, while this article provides some illustrations
based on the example of the EU, further research would need to expand this
analysis to other international organizations involved in peacebuilding.
Unintended consequences and contestation might help explain why
despite the shift in rhetoric to resilience-building and local ownership, inter-
national governance practices have not changed signiﬁcantly. While it is true
that the implementation of resilience has been accompanied by the withdra-
wal of international actors and consequently the proliferation of more remote
forms of intervention (Duﬃeld, 2010), the adoption of resilience has not
translated into substantive local ownership or more bottom-up peacebuilding
approaches (Ejdus, 2017). In many cases, local actors, in particular, civil
society actors, continue to be sidelined from the process of designing and
implementing peacebuilding activities. Instead, the main changes relate to
organizational and institutional practices, including an increased focus on
an integrated/joint/comprehensive approach to peacebuilding as a way to
manage/govern risk through joint shared analysis, joint programming, and
implementation. Further research could focus on how the processes of con-
testation identiﬁed in this article have shaped the actual implementation of
the resilience programs of diﬀerent international actors. For instance, how
does decoupling aﬀect the way international actors behave on the ground?
And how does the gap between rhetoric and peacebuilding practices under-
mine their legitimacy vis-à-vis local actors? How have local actors exploited
the uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity associated with resilience?
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Finally, it might also be worth examining in more detail the spaces of con-
testation that the implementation of resilience, and more speciﬁcally its
emphasis on an integrated approach, has opened up at the local level.
Note
1. The empirical evidence for this article draws on EU oﬃcial documents, as well
as nine semistructured qualitative interviews with diplomats and oﬃcials from
the European Commission (the Directorate-General for International
Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) and European Civil Protection and
Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO)), the European External Action
Service, and EU Delegations. The interviews were conducted face-to-face and
over the phone between September 2017 and January 2018. They are coded
to maintain the anonymity of the interviewees.
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